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Identity is something many people take for granted. At the end of a course I teach titled 
“Self and Identity,” students often write that prior to taking the class they had considered 
identity to be a given. They thought they knew exactly what it was; they were moderately 
certain that identity would be an easy concept to discuss—until we discussed it for a 
whole semester, twisting and turning concepts and evaporating their certainty. Similarly, 
Kwame Anthony Appiah’s book The Lies That Bind: Rethinking Identity is a dismantling 
of identity as a demographic and social construct. This book is a keen examination of 
many of the elements ordinary people consider to be essential parts of their identity—
particularly religion, gender, and race. Artfully, alliteratively arranged in chapters titled 
“Classification,” “Creed,” “Color,” “Country,” “Class,” and “Culture,” Appiah’s book deftly 
dismantles the central ideas of these constructs until we are left with a pile of rubble. He 
writes in the introduction, “Much of what is dangerous about [these ideas] has to do with 
the way identities—religion, nation, race, class and culture—divide us and set us against 
one another. They can be the enemies of human solidarity, the sources of war, horsemen 
of a score of apocalypses from apartheid to genocide” (xvi). This is a central theme of the 
book: we often cobble together these categories, accepting them as valid and real, and in 
using them to contribute to problems of the world—racism, Islamophobia, nationalism, 
and disregard for the poor, to provide a few examples. 
The book is highly readable, meant for a wider audience than academia. So although Ap-
piah discusses narrative and other concepts that are routinely included in philosophical 
literature about identity, this is not a book that references that body of literature or its 
jargon. That quality in itself can be considered an asset, but it would also likely be the 
main criticism of the book by someone looking for a more academic approach steeped 
in recent literature. However, Appiah impressively weaves together personal stories and 
anecdotes with examples from literature and history. He explains that identities are la-
bels that matter to people because they impact claims we make about appropriate vs. 
inappropriate behaviors (e.g., “I should do x because I am a y”). These ideas lay out what 
Appiah calls “norms of identification” (10); they are bedrock beliefs we have, founda-
tional and often essentialist. And they lead to stereotypes we expect to mirror reality. 
Early in the book, Appiah offers up examples from his own youth, “when . . . the idea 
that you could be properly English and not white seemed fairly uncommon” (7), show-
ing that notions of both “color” and “country” are blurrier and more confusing than one 
may initially realize.
Thus, the hardwired essentialist assumptions human beings use to group things and 
people into categories is a helpful theme throughout this book. The stereotypes adults 
assume about their world can be traced to childhood. As Appiah explains, “What essen-
tialism means is that children assume that these superficial differences—the ones that 
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lead to applying the label—reflect deeper, inward differences that explain a great deal of 
how people behave” (26). Recognizing the tendency we as humans have to perpetuate es-
sentialism—incomplete and erroneous as its demographic categories may be—is crucial 
to fighting the forces of racism, sexism, anti-Semitism, and other forms of oppression. 
Similarly, I would say one of the main strengths of this book is its underlying presenta-
tion of how we have approached many of the categories of identity as binaries—male vs. 
female, black vs. white, citizen vs. immigrant, etc. These binaries are often too simplistic; 
they do not track with reality. Take, for example, the gender binary of “masculine” and 
“feminine.” There is growing awareness of a segment of the American population that 
find themselves outside this binary, in a third or fourth category. This is also true else-
where in the world. Appiah offers the example of two categories in India: kothis (men 
who identify more with being feminine) and hijras (men who reject this binary and 
consider themselves something other than the binary choice between man or woman). 
Neither of these groups can be completely superimposed on our American notions of 
“transgender” or “gender neutral” (17), a fact that illustrates the tangled and labyrinthine 
nature of identity. And taken together, these two human tendencies (essentialism and 
binary thinking) show us how oversimplified our ideas of identity really are.  
Additionally, Appiah indicates that many of the identity categories we use are overstated 
in different ways. Or, as he puts it, “we have a tendency to exaggerate the continuities of 
[identities like creed and country] over time” (141).  For instance, we currently recog-
nize national identities, like German, Italian, or Pakistani, but such identities are newer, 
younger constructs. Germany was not unified until the late nineteenth century, so while 
Germans may now feel part of a common German identity, this would not have been 
true in the eighteenth century, prior to unification. The desire to homogenize a country’s 
citizens seems part and parcel of the thrust of Appiah’s argument. He fittingly points 
out that “many of the genocides of the twentieth century—against Turkey’s Armenians, 
Europe’s Jews, and Rwanda’s Tutsis—were perpetrated in the name of one people against 
another with the aim of securing a homogenous nation” (80). It is unsurprising, then, 
that Appiah asks “what does hold countries together?” (99), because in many cases coun-
tries are more of an invention than we have often considered them to be. His examina-
tion of the phenomenon of race is similar here. Modern notions of race are often traced 
back to the nineteenth century, where there is no lack of evidence that various white in-
tellectuals wanted both to categorize people by phenotypes they believed were caused by 
genotypes and also to prove the superiority of the white race. Like country (and religion), 
their  categorizations relied on a kind of continuity that does not really exist. As Appiah 
rightly points out, “Another thing became clear through the course of twentieth-century 
genetics. The vast bulk of our genetic material is shared with all normal human beings, 
whatever their race” (119). It is now transparent that even assumptions about human 
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biology are entangled with questions and notions that mirror our ideas of nations. We 
are left with stereotypes that do not match reality and instead are riddled with illusions.
Similarly, Appiah’s diagnosis of religion is on point. He demonstrates that the world’s 
major religions are subject to complexities that disunify what we often think of as a 
unified whole. He writes, “If by a religion you meant a single coherent set of doctrines, 
precepts, and practices, then none of the familiar global religions—nor world—would be 
one religion” (41). Religion is often subject to a kind of thinking he describes as “who’s 
out” vs. “who’s in” (40); this stems directly from how religions have been prone to schism 
since the beginning of religion itself. Additionally, who is part of the “in-group” is sub-
jective and also subject to change. Whether or not members of the Bahá’í religion are 
actually a sect of Islam is not an agreed-upon truth. Similar questions arise over whether 
Mormons are Christians (42). To claim that Hinduism is “a single coherent whole” is 
also problematic, Appiah claims, due to all of the different texts, gods, festivals, tradi-
tions, and temples that exist across the subcontinent of India (44). He also importantly 
points out that the word “Hinduism” was introduced in the nineteenth century, and that 
some would claim this moment signaled the birth of the religion itself (43). This claim 
goes against the grain of how most people think about religions, especially those like 
Hinduism that have well-known ancient texts. Thus, one might wonder precisely what 
holds a religion together. Appiah is quick to note that traditions, practices, and scriptural 
interpretations are all subject to change and that we are perhaps in a better position if we 
think of our religious affiliations and traditions as being more fluid and mutable. 
Perhaps the grossest mistake scholars have made in this way of thinking is the bewilder-
ing conception of “Western culture” or the “West.” This, too, is a nineteenth-century in-
vention, emerging from imperialism. The very concept of “Western culture” is supposed 
to trace back to an area technically outside its own boundaries (namely Mesopotamia, 
technically in the Middle East). If this term is supposed to signify “Christendom,” it is 
still a misapplication, since Christianity is practiced on every continent in the world 
now and also did not emerge from Europe or any part of “the West.” This discussion is 
one of the crowning achievements of Appiah’s book. He makes clear the “identity lie” 
that binds us, the other motivating factors of classifying people into binary groups (us 
vs. them; Christian vs. non-Christian), and how forces like imperialism and colonialism 
have wreaked havoc on our very understanding of the world. 
The chapter on class serves as an outlier in the book in the sense that class does have 
continuity, Appiah explains, and often more so than we assume (141). The chapter is rife 
with examples of how social classes, based on monetary wealth and family background, 
exist cross-culturally and historically, contributing to strong associations with norms 
of behavior and proper treatment toward members of classes and acknowledging class 
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distinctions themselves. This chapter is crucial because it serves as an important foil to 
the hodge-podge concepts of nationality and race. Because the stringent boundaries be-
tween classes in some places have existed since before the nineteenth century, they have 
had long-lasting effects on how we assume people will behave in many contexts. 
In conclusion, I recommend this engaging, approachable book for anyone who wants to 
explore social ontology in a broader way. Delving into the imprecisions, errors, and op-
pressive forces that have forged the boundaries of many of these categories may be hard 
work, but it is nonetheless important work to do if we are to face reality and overcome 
the lies we have inherited. Since philosophers are in the business of making distinctions 
between appearances and reality, what is real and what is less so, this is work we should 
be doing for our own betterment as well. 
